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“DOOMED SOCIAL ENGINEERING?”— 
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM RELATED TO SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION: THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 
Judge Robert W. Lee* 
In July 2013, almost 300 County Court Judges1 of the State of Florida attended 
their annual conference in Naples, Florida, for two-and-a-half days of continuing 
judicial education. During one plenary session,2 the judges from across the state 
listened receptively to a presentation involving issues pertaining to runaway LGBT3 
teenagers and the appropriate judicial response. In another plenary session, the 
judges discussed issues concerning the treatment of transgender individuals in the 
court system. Both presentations seemed unremarkable and noncontroversial. And 
yet, just twenty years before, Florida lawyers faced a significant clash of values 
concerning how LGBT people should be treated by attorneys and in the court system, 
including accusations that The Florida Bar was engaged in “doomed social 
engineering.”4 
 ________________________  
 * County Court Judge, Broward County. B.A., Jacksonville University; M.A., California State University, 
Dominguez Hills; J.D., University of Florida. The author especially thanks Gregory Boan, legal intern from Nova 
Southeastern University, for his research assistance, particularly with locating the many letters published in the 
Florida Bar News. Additionally, in this age of online research, the author thanks those institutions that provided 
access to materials not yet available online, including the Broward County Law Library (for back issues of the 
Florida Bar News) and the Stonewall National Museum and Archives (for hard-to-locate and rare materials relating 
to the LGBT experience), both in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 
 1. Florida is comprised of  sixty-seven counties. As of July 2013, the state of Florida had 322 County Court 
Judges. FLA. STAT. § 34.022 (Lexis 2012). Generally, Florida County Court Judges have jurisdiction in 
misdemeanor cases, violations of municipal and county ordinances, and all actions at law and equity in which the 
matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of $15,000.00. Id. §§ 34.01(1)(a), (4) (2012). Florida County Court 
Judges are frequently, however, designated to handle work falling within the jurisdiction of a circuit judge. Id. § 
26.57 (2012). 
 2. Conference of County Court Judges of Fla., 2013 Annual Education Program (2013). 
 3. In this article, the author, with apologies to any offended, will use the abbreviation “LGBT” to refer to 
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, as well as any other person who may be questioning, queer, confused, 
intersexed, etc. The author believes the abbreviation LGBT has become sufficiently widely accepted and understood 
without need for further elaboration or unwieldy characterization. 
 4. Richard N. Friedman, Letter to the Editor, Discrimination, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 1992, at 3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, the Florida Supreme Court5 approved6 Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Florida 
Rules of Professional Conduct which specifically provides that an attorney shall not: 
engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, 
or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or 
discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or 
other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account 
of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, 
marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, 
employment, or physical characteristic.7 
Just over a year later, the Florida Supreme Court further approved8 Canon 3B(5) of 
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: 
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A 
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or 
conduct9 manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias 
or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, 
disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, and shall 
not permit staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s 
direction and control to do so. This section does not preclude the 
consideration of race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, 
 ________________________  
 5. Under Florida law, the Florida Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to regulate the conduct of 
attorneys and judges in their roles as attorneys and judges. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(a), 15. The Court does not, 
however, have “constitutional authority” over the employment practices of lawyers. The Florida Bar re: 
Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1993). 
 6. Id. at 722. The rule took effect January 1, 1994. Id. 
 7. See 4 Fla. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law §103 (2008) (discussing the rule as defining “what constitutes 
misconduct”); Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility Law in Florida: The Year in Review 1995, 20 NOVA 
L. REV. 223, 248 n.144 (1995) (quoting rule). 
 8. In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1039–40 (Fla. 1994). The decision was issued on 
September 29, 1994 and took effect January 1, 1995. Id. at 1037, 1040. The first two sentences were modeled after 
the language proposed as part of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 1037–38. 
The final sentence, however, was added by the Florida Supreme Court upon suggestion. The opinion is silent as to 
the party offering the suggestion, whether it was The Florida Bar or one of the more than dozen persons who filed 
individual comments. Id. at 1037, 1039–40. See Allan H. Terl, An Essay on the History of Lesbian and Gay Rights 
in Florida, 24 NOVA L. REV. 793, 831 (2000) (discussing the extension of the judicial canons in Florida to cover 
prejudice and bias based on sexual orientation). For a discussion of a situation involving sexual orientation and when 
it might be an issue in a legal proceeding, taking the case out of the Judicial Canons, see Marisa Gonzalez, Note, If 
You Can’t Fix It, You’ve Got to Stand It: Lofton v. Department of Children and Family Services and the Florida 
Adoption Statute’s Discrimination Against Homosexuals and Foster Children, 7 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. 
ADVOC. 277, 292–93, 318–20 (2008). For a discussion of the adoption of the canon from the Model Code, see Sanaz 
Alempour, Note, Judicial Recusal & Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation a Valid Cause in Florida? 32 NOVA L. 
REV. 609, 610 (2008). 
 9. In the commentary to Rule 3B(5), “conduct” is explained as including gestures, facial expression and 
body language. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3B(5) cmt. (1994). See Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 
So. 2d at 1048 (setting forth the commentary as adopted by the Florida Supreme Court). 
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sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or other similar factors 
when they are issues in the proceeding.10 
The primary impetus of the Florida Supreme Court’s action was a report from 
its Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission concluding that women and minorities 
continued to face many obstacles in the practice of law.11 At the same time, Miami 
attorney Frank Scruggs, joined by almost sixty other attorneys, including Florida 
Governor Lawton Chiles, submitted a written request to The Florida Bar seeking the 
promulgation of specific “anti-bias rules.”12 At least one other Supreme Court special 
committee had similarly considered the issue.13 Ultimately as a result, as explained 
hereinafter, the Bar concluded that such obstacles could better be overcome if 
members of the Bar were subject to “specific rules prohibiting discriminatory 
practices.”14 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court referred the possibility of related 
amendments to the judicial canons to its Committee on Standards of Conduct 
Governing Judges.15 The addition of sexual orientation to the rules and canons, 
however, would come only after months of divisive public debate.16 
THE FLORIDA BAR AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION BEFORE THE 1990S 
Until 1978, no person could be a member of The Florida Bar who was a known 
or “admitted” homosexual.17 In 1978, the Florida Supreme Court considered a case 
in which an attorney acknowledged his sexual orientation in response to a question 
 ________________________  
 10. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3B(5) (1994). 
 11. The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1993). 
See also  Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 87 (Fla. 2000) (noting that the concern to protect women and minorities 
from discrimination was intended to expand the meaning of the prior rule, not restrict it); Mark D. Killian, Governors 
Begin Debating Rules to Ban Discrimination, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jun. 1, 1992, at 7 [hereinafter Killian I] (noting that 
the professed “need for the rule flows from the Supreme Court’s Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission report 
which found that institutional bias permeates the legal profession, threatening the foundation of the court system”); 
Anti-Bias Rules, Retention Campaigns, Budget Fill 1992, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jan. 1, 1993, at 11 [hereinafter Anti-Bias 
Rules] (“[t]here had been no question that ethnic, racial, and gender bias had been problems in the legal system.”). 
See Nicole Lancia, New Rule, New York: A Bifocal Approach to Discipline and Discrimination, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 949, 955 (2009) (discussing the Florida report). 
 12. Board to Vote on Anti-Bias Rule Comments, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 15, 1992, at 15 [hereinafter Board 
to Vote]. This procedure is permitted by Rule 1-12.1(f), R. Regulating Fla. Bar (1992) (in lieu of proceeding through 
The Florida Bar Board of Governors, a group of “50 members in good standing” may file a petition to amend a rule 
directly with the Florida Supreme Court). 
 13. Anti-Bias Rules, supra note 11, at 11.  
 14. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 721. 
 15. Supreme Court to Consider Changes to Judicial Code, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jun. 1, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter 
Supreme Court to Consider]. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 85–203. 
 17. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 358 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. 1978). The routine exclusion of LGBT persons 
from professions was, of course, not limited to law. See STACY BRAUKMAN, COMMUNISTS AND PERVERTS UNDER 
THE PALMS: THE JOHNS COMMITTEE IN FLORIDA 1956–1965, 4–5, 121 (2012) (discussing the effort to “remove 
homosexuals from state agencies, particularly schools); ARTHUR GUY MATHEWS, IS HOMOSEXUALITY A MENACE? 
155, 164–65 (1957) (urging local, state and federal governments to remove “all of the homosexuals [ . . . ] from 
office,” even if they have the ability to do the job); KEN WORTHY, THE NEW HOMOSEXUAL REVOLUTION 7, 116 
(1965) (expressing concern that homosexuals already “have taken over” some professions, and are taking the place 
of “normal” persons in college, “closing [ . . . ] more and more career-doors to the normal boy or girl”). 
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from the Board of Bar Examiners.18 In keeping with long-held practice, The Florida 
Bar was prepared to deny the applicant’s admission.19 The Florida Supreme Court, 
however, found no “rational connection between homosexual orientation and fitness 
to practice law.”20 Nevertheless, Justice Joseph Boyd dissented, bluntly declaring 
that no one should be able to become a member of The Florida Bar “whose sexual 
life style contemplates routine violation of a criminal statute.”21 Prior to this date, 
The Florida Bar on several occasions revoked the membership of persons who had 
committed homosexual acts.22 
Notwithstanding the 1978 decision, by 1981 The Florida Bar was continuing to 
question applicants about their private sexual conduct.23 For instance, in one case, 
The Bar discovered that an applicant may have been removed from military service 
consideration because of his homosexuality.24 The Board of Bar Examiners 
questioned the applicant, who acknowledged his “continuing sexual preference for 
men,” but who would not respond to inquiries dealing with specific sexual activity.25 
The Florida Supreme Court expanded on its 1978 ruling by holding that “[p]rivate 
noncommercial sex acts between consenting adults are not relevant to prove fitness 
to practice law,” with a caveat dealing with “nonconsensual sex or sex involving 
minors.”26 Once again, Justice Boyd dissented, this time joined by Justice James 
Alderman.27 They argued that the Court should place no reins on the authority of the 
 ________________________  
 18. 358 So. 2d at 8. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 9. In doing so, the Florida Supreme Court relied on language in a concurring opinion eight years 
prior that “[t]he present record contains no evidence scientific, medical, pathological or otherwise suggesting 
homosexual behavior among consenting adults is so indicative of character baseness as to warrant a condemnation 
per se of a participant’s ability ever to live up to and perform other societal duties, including professional duties and 
responsibilities assigned to members of The Bar.” Id. at 10, quoting Fla. Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1970) 
(Ervin, C.J., concurring). Just five years prior, homosexuality was still classified as a mental illness. See MICHAEL 
SHELTON, FAMILY PRIDE: WHAT LGBT FAMILIES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NAVIGATING HOME, SCHOOL, AND 
SAFETY IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOODS xx (2013). 
 21. 358 So. 2d at 10 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Justice Joseph Boyd was elected to the Florida Supreme Court in 
1968 and began to sit in 1969. While on the Court, he was known for reading his Bible as the “first thing” he would 
do each day “upon arrival at the court.” W. MANLEY & C. BROWN, JR., THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, 1917-
1972, 320–21 (2006). He believed that the Bible set forth the “basic norms for human conduct.” Id. at 321. Boyd 
viewed “liberals” as “his principal foe.” Id. at 324. He served on the court until 1987. Id. at 320, 325. Justice Boyd’s 
strong views against gay persons were expressed just a year after entertainer Anita Bryant led a successful 
referendum on June 7, 1977 to repeal Dade County’s ordinance that protected lesbian and gay individuals from 
employment discrimination. See ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY 125 (1977). The singer commented 
that the repeal effort “overwhelmingly” demonstrated the Florida voters’ “revulsion toward homosexuality 
becoming an acceptable, normal life-style.” Id. See also BRIAN MCNAUGHT, EDITOR’S NOTE, ON BEING GAY 4 
(1988) (“[f]ollowing the Dade County vote, there was a spate of progay civil rights ordinances which were either 
overturned or rejected”). 
 22. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1970) (attorney convicted of engaging in public 
homosexual activity); Kimball v. Fla. Bar, 465 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (attorney who had been convicted of 
engaging in public homosexual activity in 1956 unsuccessfully sought federal court intervention to have Bar 
membership restored). 
 23. See Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981). 
 24. Id. at 1316. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1317. 
 27. Id. at 1317–19 (Boyd & Alderman, JJ., dissenting). Justice Alderman was not yet sitting on the Florida 
Supreme Court when the previous decision was issued in 1978. See In re Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 358 So. 2d 7, 
10 (Fla. 1978). 
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Board of Bar Examiners to question applicants about private sexual conduct, and 
further noted that the record in the underlying case demonstrated that the applicant 
might still be involved with homosexual conduct with “no intention of changing his 
ways.”28 
The next year, the Florida Supreme Court authorized an attorney who had been 
disbarred for twenty-five years as the result of public, albeit consensual, homosexual 
activity to apply for readmission.29 Because of the lengthy passage of time, however, 
the Court required that the attorney retake and pass the entire Bar examination as a 
condition of readmission.30 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROPOSALS 
As the 1990s began, the public attitude in general towards LGBT people 
continued to change for the positive, with increased protections in the area of 
employment.31 The addition of sexual orientation to The Florida Bar’s anti-
discrimination proposal was arguably fomented by many other issues percolating 
through the state at that time.32 
In late 1991, the Public Interest Law Section of The Florida Bar sought approval 
from the Bar to lobby the Florida Legislature to change a state law preventing 
homosexuals from adopting.33 The Board of Governors denied the request, citing the 
question as one “of deep philosophical or emotional division among a substantial 
segment of the Bar.”34 After threats of the Section leaving the Bar, the chair-elect of 
the Public Interest Law Section and the President-elect of the Bar met in May 1992 
in an attempt to amiably work out their differences.35 At that time, the Public Interest 
Law Section, which had grown to 257 members, considered doing its advocacy work 
through an outside, non-Bar affiliated nonprofit organization to avoid conflicts with 
the Bar.36 The Public Interest Law Section believed it was uniquely positioned to 
address these types of issues because its members were the attorneys who typically 
had experience in trying these cases; and as a result, the Section could be helpful on 
any anti-discrimination efforts.37 
 ________________________  
 28. 403 So. 2d at 1319 (Boyd & Alderman, JJ., dissenting). 
 29. In re Petition of Kimball, 425 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1982). 
 30. Id. at 534. 
 31. ERIC MARCUS, IS IT A CHOICE? xiii, 103 (1999). By 1994, only four communities in Florida provided 
protection of some extent based on sexual orientation: Alachua County, Palm Beach County, Key West, and Miami 
Beach. PAUL HAMPTON CROCKETT, GAY LAW 101: WHAT FLORIDA’S GAYS AND LESBIANS NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT THE LEGAL SYSTEM 95 (1994).  
 32. Richard N. Friedman, Letters, Discrimination, Fla. Bar News, Nov. 15, 1992, at 3. 
 33. David W. Young, Letter to the Editor, Section Lobbying, FLA. BAR NEWS, Apr. 1, 1992, at 2; Gary 
Blankenship, Bar, Public Interest Law Section Work Things Out, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jun. 1, 1992, at 9 [hereinafter 
Blankenship I]; Terl, supra note 8, at 851–53 (discussing the issue of sexual orientation as addressed by the Public 
Interest Law Section). 
 34. Young, supra note 33, at 2. The decision of the Board of Governors to deny permission to lobby was 
subsequently upheld by the Florida Supreme Court. See Blankenship I, supra note 33, at 9. 
 35. Blankenship I, supra note 33, at 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Mark D. Killian, PILS Wants to File Brief on Proposed Bias Rules, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992 at 
15 [hereinafter Killian II]; Hanlon Says PILS Small but Important, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 34. 
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The Family Law Section of the Bar was also beginning to reach out to LGBT 
members. At the annual Family Law Section luncheon in 1992, the incoming chair 
discussed the creation of a “Gay and Lesbian Committee” within the Section.38 One 
attorney responded with a letter to the Florida Bar News that “it was a disgrace to 
even entertain the idea,” and that the Bar “should put a stop to this small group within 
the Bar Association who are trying to drag us down to their level and have us give 
support to certain deviates in our society.”39 The attorney was concerned that gays 
and lesbians would “infiltrate other committees and push their agenda.”40 Clearly 
exasperated, the attorney asked, “[w]hen will it stop?”41  
This letter drew a sharp response from another attorney who criticized the prior 
letter writer and argued in support of the incoming chair’s proposal: 
As professionals who have an active role in all areas of the law—
legislation, enforcement, interpretation, clarification—it is our 
responsibility to have open minds and to approach all members of 
our society as potentially deserving individuals who have rights and 
responsibilities. [. . .] As a section, we are to address all the family 
law issues, not just ones that appeal to us or that were envisioned by 
earlier generations acting under a different set of social mores. Gay 
and lesbian issues deserve the same discussion and advocacy as 
issues brought forth by the stereotypical mom and dad with two 
children and a white picket fence. The idea that the section should 
not include a Gay and Lesbian Committee is outdated and puts 
family law practitioners into legal blinders.42 
Notwithstanding the original letter writer’s frustration, the Family Law Section 
created the Committee.43 
At the same time, the American Bar Association was welcoming its first delegate 
from the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association,44 triggering criticism from 
some Florida attorneys.45 A former President of The Florida Bar, Patrick Emmanuel, 
publicly resigned his membership from the ABA, citing as one of his reasons the 
accommodation to lesbian and gay lawyers.46 
 ________________________  
 38. Richard B. Kay, Letter to the Editor, Gay/Lesbian Committee, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1, 1992, at 2. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. See also Richard B. Kay, Letter to the Editor, Committee Opposed, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 
2 (by supporting the discussion of LGBT issues, the Family Law Section is helping to “los[e] the battle to maintain 
some semblance of morality in our society”). 
 42. Ellen G. Shipman, Letter to the Editor, Family Issues, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 15, 1992, at 2. 
 43. Letter, Council Responds, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 2. The Council noted that the Gay and 
Lesbian Issues Committee was created “with the hope that issues related to this sensitive area can be better-addressed 
by providing this forum for discussion.” Id. 
 44. Patrick G. Emmanuel, Letter, ABA Abortion, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 39. For a discussion of 
the issue of sexual orientation as addressed by the ABA, see Terl, supra note 8, at 818–19. 
 45. Martha Jean Eichelberg, Letter, Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 3. 
 46. Emmanuel, supra note 44, at 39. Another member stated that he discontinued his membership in the 
ABA because he “concluded that the organization no longer represented me, my interests, nor the values I respect.” 
C. Wesley G. Currier, Letter, Bar Ideas, FLA. BAR NEWS, Dec. 1, 1992, at 3. 
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Another area of controversy was the AIDS epidemic and the need for legal 
services for this disadvantaged community.47 Perhaps in response to fear of AIDS 
expressed in the Florida Bar News,48 one of the members of The Florida Bar Board 
of Governors, Theodore Struhl, a Miami physician, educated the Board on the topic 
of AIDS at the Board’s May 1993 meeting.49 Dr. Struhl grimly advised the Board 
that AIDS, then considered a death sentence, was a disease generally ravaging 
women and minorities.50 He further reminded the Board, however, that AIDS could 
not be contracted through “casual contact.”51 Nevertheless, many attorneys viewed 
AIDS as a reason to avoid certain groups, including homosexuals.52 
In addition to the issues involving the Bar directly, many attorneys also found 
themselves challenging an initiative effort by the American Family Association 
(AFA) to amend the Florida Constitution.53 If the electorate passed the AFA 
initiative, any local or state laws or regulations providing protections based on sexual 
orientation would be repealed and banned.54 The nascent Miami-based Gay and 
Lesbian Lawyers Association (GALLA) was instrumental in putting together a team 
to successfully fight the initiative in the courts.55 Ultimately, the Florida Supreme 
Court struck the initiative from the ballot for violating state law involving initiative 
proposals.56 
Outside of the Bar, other situations arose that brought attention to, and some 
would argue empowered, the LGBT community.57 In 1993, the State of Florida 
released voluminous records pertaining to the work of a State Committee—the Johns 
Committee—which three decades before had taken upon itself the duty to root out 
and eliminate homosexuals from state employment, including state schools.58 As one 
researcher noted, the release of these documents revealed to Floridians “a chapter in 
the state’s history that most saw as appalling.”59 The researcher further stated that: 
 ________________________  
 47. Video Shows Lawyers Helping AIDS Victims, FLA. BAR NEWS, Apr. 15, 1993, at 8; Lawyers Sign Up 
for AIDS Network, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1993, at 47. 
 48. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that attorneys are rightfully concerned that hiring a 
homosexual might lead to the spreading AIDS in the law office). For a discussion of Friedman’s letter concerning 
fear of the spread of AIDS in the workplace, see infra text accompanying note 146. 
 49. See AIDS Hitting Hard at Women and Minorities, FLA. BAR NEWS, July 1, 1993, at 18.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 3; infra text accompanying note 146; Robert L. Guyer, Letters, Clean 
Living, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1, 1993, at 2 (stating that AIDS results from a violation of the “Biblical moral code”). 
One attorney who was living with AIDS responded with “gratitude that those with attitudes like Mr. Guyer’s are not 
making the bulk of policy in this country, this state, or the Bar.” Allan H. Terl, Letter to the Editor, AIDS, FLA. BAR 
NEWS, Sept. 1, 1993, at 2. 
 53. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General – Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018, 
1019 (Fla. 1994). 
 54. Id. at 1020 (“[r]epeals all laws inconsistent with this amendment”). If adopted, the constitutional 
provision would bring into question the effect of even Bar “rules” dealing with sexual orientation. 
 55. Id. at 1018. For a further discussion of GALLA, see infra text accompanying notes 85–87, 180–81, 190–
91. 
 56. 632 So. 2d at 1021. For a discussion of the process of initiative review in Florida, see Robert W. Lee, 
Pre-Election Initiative Review in Florida: A Framework for Analysis, 69 FLA. B.J. 14, Mar. 1995, at 14–20 (citing 
Laws Related to Discrimination case on several occasions). 
 57. See Braukman, supra note 17, at 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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The opening of the records itself became a sensation, as journalists 
flocked to the state archives in Tallahassee to comb through 
documents, find the most eye-popping quotes from interrogation 
transcripts, and tell the stories of those most egregiously victimized 
by the committee. Their reporting focused on the [. . .] most 
outrageous and unconstitutional practices, as well as what looked 
like to modern eyes like brazen racism and homophobia.60 
At the same time, the voters of Tampa repealed an effort by the municipal 
government to expand civil rights protections to gays and lesbians.61 By 1993, the 
case challenging the repeal effort had made its way to the Florida Supreme Court.62 
Moreover, the civil rights of LGBT persons were prominently in the news as 
thousands of persons from Florida planned for and attended the March on 
Washington the same year.63 Finally, the issue of hate crimes against LGBT persons 
was more widely reported as the Florida Legislature amended the hate crimes law in 
1991 to also cover sexual orientation.64 
THE FLORIDA BAR AND THE INITIAL PROPOSALS 
At a meeting of The Florida Bar Board of Governors in May 1992, the Board 
received its preliminary report from the Implementation Committee for 
Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession, although the recommendations were 
not unanimous.65 The proposal sought rules prohibiting “judges and lawyers from 
exhibiting racial, gender, and ethnic discrimination.”66 Sexual orientation, however, 
was not addressed in the original proposals.67 The Chair noted an unsettled divide in 
the Committee.68 Opponents of the proposed rule doubted whether the actual 
evidence demonstrated that discriminatory conduct necessitated any rule change.69 
They also argued that sufficient laws already existed to address discrimination and 
to provide related remedies. Discriminatory conduct is already illegal, and remedies 
now exist to adequately compensate victims who can prove they are discriminated 
against.70 Moreover, opponents claimed that the danger of false claims of 
discrimination could be used as a “coercive tool” against law firms to promote 
minorities to partnership.71 Finally, they expressed concern that the proposed rule 
 ________________________  
 60. Id.  
 61. Tampa Gay Rights Ordinance Referendum to be Reviewed, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jan. 15, 1993, at 30.  
 62. Id. The issue before the Supreme Court addressed whether the recall effort should have even been placed 
on the ballot, as questions had been raised concerning voters’ signatures during the petition drive. Id.  
 63. Tao Woolfe & William E. Gibson, South Florida Gays to Join 1 Million Expected in Capitol, S. FLA. 
SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 25, 1993, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1993-04-25/news/9302070939_1_gay-
pride-march-lesbian-task-force-emily-vetter#.UidOktju32U.email (last visited April 17, 2014). 
 64. Hate Crimes on the Rise Under New Definitions, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1, 1993, at 20–21. 
 65. Killian I, supra note 11, at 7. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. See also Don Lacy, Letter to the Editor, Disabled, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jun. 15, 1992, at 2. 
 68. Killian I, supra note 11, at 7. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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would “violate First Amendment rights” and “not pass constitutional muster by 
virtue of being an abridgement of free speech.”72 The Committee did not, however, 
express similar reservations concerning the proposed canon involving judicial 
conduct.73 The meeting ended with the parties agreeing to continue working on the 
proposals.74 
Soon after the first proposals were made known to Florida attorneys through the 
Florida Bar News,75 a few attorneys began to publicly respond. One of the first to 
respond was an attorney who complimented The Florida Bar on its 
“progressiveness,” but who also objected that the proposal did not include the 
disabled, “[w]hy cannot The Florida Bar also protect the disabled at the same time 
that it is trying to eliminate discrimination based upon racial, gender, and ethnic 
considerations?”76 Another attorney responded that he had not experienced any 
discrimination as an attorney who had used a wheelchair for thirty-two years, and he 
did not believe that The Florida Bar should try to “cure our personal problems.”77 
Still another worried that Bar dues might be used to compensate those claiming 
discriminatory conduct.78 
THE FLORIDA BAR AND THE FINAL PROPOSAL 
The Bar Board of Governors met again on August 1, 1992.79 At this meeting, the 
Board would agree to add sexual orientation as one of the prohibited categories of 
discrimination.80 Although the Board voted to forward the anti-bias proposal to the 
Florida Supreme Court for action, the Board also added the entire proposal to its 
September 1992 meeting agenda for further discussion.81 While the discussion was 
lengthy, the rule appeared to be on its way to approval by the Board for submission 
to the Florida Supreme Court.82 The area of dispute was enforcement involving 
employment discrimination claims.83 One faction wanted The Florida Bar to be able 
to investigate accusations of discrimination, while another faction believed The 
 ________________________  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Killian I, supra note 11, at 7. 
 75. Gary Blankenship, Board Okays, Sends to Court Anti-Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 15, 1992, at 4 
[hereinafter Blankenship II] (noting that proposal was announced in July 1 edition of the Bar News). 
 76. Lacy, supra note 67, at 2. 
 77. William M. Hereford, Letters, Personal Problems, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1, 1992, at 2. 
 78. Henry P. Trawick, Jr., Letters, Thought Control, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1, 1992 at 2. 
 79. Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 1. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1, 4. The meeting was held on September 24–25, noticed in the Florida Bar News on Sept. 15, 
1992. Mark Killian, Bar Board of Governors to Meet in North Florida, FLA. BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 1992, at 3. The 
notice advised that the rule proposal would be discussed at the meeting. 
 82. Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 1. 
 83. Id.; Gary Blankenship, Governors Debate Discrimination, Remedies, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 15, 1992, at 
10. See also John A. Truesdell, Letters, Bias Rules, FLA. BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 1992, at 2 (noting that the “proclaimed 
intention” of the rule is to go “beyond the judicial process to employment”); R. Layton Mank, Letters, Bias Rule, 
Fla. Bar NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 2 (arguing that while the goals of the proposal are “commendable,” The Florida Bar 
has no authority to discipline lawyers for their employment practices). 
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Florida Bar should not act unless an outside agency had made a finding of 
discrimination.84 
At the meeting, Victoria S. Sigler,85 a member of the Gay and Lesbian Lawyers 
Association (GALLA), spoke.86 GALLA had wanted a voice at the Board meeting, 
and Sigler had agreed to attend the meeting to raise the issue of sexual orientation.87 
In outing herself,88 she described her own experiences and urged the Board to add 
sexual orientation to the list of groups protected from discrimination, noting that 
“America has always protected the rights of individuals[,] and we have always 
protected diversity.”89 She further argued that “[m]eaningful access to the courts 
means unbiased access.”90 Board member Stuart Grossman then made the motion to 
include sexual orientation as one of the protected groups and stated: 
Can’t they be free of this kind of bigotry? [ . . .] Would the use of 
the term “queer” or “gay” be appropriate in talking with any kind of 
witness, or lawyer, or judge? Can we possibly leave this out, having 
voted against bias? 
This is not condoning a style of life, that frankly I don’t think people 
make conscious decisions to have.  It makes sure this new rule bolts 
down all that parameters for what we know to be right.91 
Perhaps recognizing the changing cultural norms,92 the Board approved 
Grossman’s motion by a vote of thirty-one to eight, and the proposal to submit to the 
Florida Supreme Court was thought then to be finalized.93 The Bar’s final proposed 
version defined as “prejudicial to the administration of justice” engaging in conduct, 
which included, “to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate 
or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers 
on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital 
status, sexual orientation, or age.”94 
 ________________________  
 84. Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 4; Killian II, supra note 37, at 15. 
 85. Victoria Sigler would go on to become the first openly LGBT person to serve on the state court bench in 
Florida. Loann Halden, Victoria Sigler Climbs the Judicial Ladder, THE WEEKLY NEWS, Apr. 20, 2000, at 2. 
 86. Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 5. 
 87. Telephone Interview with Victoria S. Sigler, Circuit Judge, Florida Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Sept. 16, 
2013). 
 88. Id.; Jan Pudlow, The Invisible Minority Came out at the Diversity Symposium, FLA. BAR NEWS, Apr. 30, 
2007, at 8. 
 89. Pudlow supra note 88 at 8; Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 5. 
 90. Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 5. 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. See Robert Batey, Atticus Finch, Boris A. Max, and the Lawyers Dilemma, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
389, 394 n.39 (2005). 
 93. Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 5. 
 94. Amendments to Rules, So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1993). One commentator explained that “the rule would 
make uttering a racial slur, making a comment demeaning to women, or discriminating because of sexual preference 
a disciplinary offense.” Killian II, supra note 37, at 15. The Board also approved proposed rule 4-8.7 pertaining to 
discrimination, but the Florida Supreme Court would eventually disapprove this rule. The Florida Bar re: 
Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1993). The text of proposed rule 4-8.7 
read as follows: 
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Before the next Board of Governors meeting convened, The Florida Bar 
Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Profession met and was brought up to date 
on the anti-bias proposal.95 Members of the Board of Governors present at the 
meeting advised the Committee Members that the proposed anti-bias rule had been 
approved, but that the Board had declined to require that the Bar take responsibility 
for investigating claims of employment discrimination, relying instead on 
government agencies to take this role.96 The proposal would consider an outside 
agency’s finding of discrimination to be a presumed violation of the anti-bias rule.97 
The Board failed, however, to address situations in which no agency would address 
a particular type of discrimination, such as sexual orientation.98 Nevertheless, the 
Board felt the proposal was stronger by making it clear that even though the rule did 
not specifically include the word “employment,” the Board intended “to cover 
employment in the rule by barring discrimination ‘in the course of the practice of 
law.’”99 At least one Committee member suggested that the proposal include a 
“comment” expressing the Board’s intent when the proposed rule was submitted to 
the Florida Supreme Court.100 A “comment” to a Florida rule of court is a published 
explanation or elaboration of the rule.101 As with a rule, any related comment must 
also be approved by the Florida Supreme Court.102  The Board agreed that comments 
to the proposed rule would be addressed at its September 1992 Board meeting.103 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the information about the proposed rule published in 
the Florida Bar News provoked many written responses, most of which opposed the 
proposed rule.104 One commentator referred to the “angered” response of the 
 ________________________  
If a lawyer has been adjudicated or held to have committed, in the course of the practice of 
law, a prohibited discriminatory practice by a final order of an agency or court of competent 
jurisdiction, after all appellate rights have been exhausted, such conduct shall be subject to 
discipline under these Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 
The finding of the agency or court making the determination shall be filed by the lawyer 
subject thereof with the executive director of The Florida Bar within 60 days of the entry 
thereof, and shall be admissible as prima facie evidence of a violation of these rules. 
Id. 
 95. Gary Blankenship, Committee Endorses Bias Rule Compromise, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Board to Vote, supra note 12, at 15.  
 98. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 3 (“[T]he proposed Bar rules require an outside agency or court to first 
find discrimination. As a practical matter it is not likely that there will be very many instances of sexual preference 
discrimination cases that will come before the Bar.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 875 So. 2d 448, 452 (Fla. 2004) (“[t]he 
comment to the rule is amended to provide guidance”); In re Family Law Rules of Procedure, 663 So. 2d 1049, 
1053–54 (Fla. 1995) (“comments to the rules are included for explanation and guidance only and are not adopted as 
an official part of the rules”); In re Amendment to Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 550 So. 2d 457, 457 
(Fla. 1989) (same). 
 102. See Reichman v. State, 497 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (Barfield, J., concurring) (referring to 
the Supreme Court’s disapproval of a proposed committee note); The Florida Bar re: Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
482 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 1985) (declining to approve a proposed committee note). 
 103. Gary Blankenship, Bar Tables Proposed Anti-Bias Rule Comments, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 
5 [hereinafter cited as Blankenship III]. 
 104. See infra text accompanying notes 105–116. See also John B. Thompson, Letter, Bias Rule, Jan. 1, 1993, 
at 2 (referring to the “large volume of letters from members of The Florida Bar nearly unanimously expressing 
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membership.105 While some objections focused on the entire rule itself,106 the great 
majority of the complaints were focused on the inclusion of sexual orientation as a 
protected class.107 
Objections to the inclusion of sexual orientation in the anti-bias rule trended 
along several arguments. One of the first objections raised was that the term “sexual 
orientation” was not defined in the proposed rule; and as a result, the rule could 
require an attorney to condone certain sexual practices the attorney found 
offensive.108 One attorney asserted that he would not accept “unnatural sexual acts 
involving misuse of the human body by oral or anal intercourse, or other such 
practices.”109 As another attorney complained: 
What will this rule require of Florida lawyers? What sort of 
employee attitude and obnoxious conduct will one be forced to 
tolerate? Will discrimination against homosexuals in a social 
context be subject to the closest scrutiny and weighed to determine 
if it is “prejudicial to the administration of justice?” In this brave 
and bizarre new world, one can only wonder what will be next.110 
This line of objection led to the invocation of those unlikely hyperbolic 
comparisons that often accompany discussions to provide legal protections to LGBT 
individuals.111 One attorney expressed his perhaps feigned sense of hopelessness: 
Thanks to our Board of Governors, discrimination may soon be 
verboten against rapists, pedophiles and necrophiles. Let’s not 
discriminate against those practicing incest or bestiality lest we be 
somehow less worthy of practicing law. Does our Board of 
 ________________________  
misgivings about the Bar’s new ‘anti-bias’ rule.”). One exception was a comment from one practicing attorney 
noting that if The Florida Bar “is to have any use at all, it should be to ensure that all honest attorneys, rich, poor, 
black, white, Indian, Hispanic, male, female, straight, gay, lesbian, young, old, or licensed resident aliens from Mars, 
receive the same opportunities and respect as all other attorneys.” Karen T. Brandon, Letter, Gender Handbook, 
FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 3. 
 105. Mark D. Killian, YLD Reaffirms Proposed Anti-Bias Rule Support, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 1, 1992, at 27 
[hereinafter cited as Killian III]. 
 106. Teresa J. Reid Rambo, Letter, Bias Rules, FLA. BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 1992, at 2 (claiming that the 
proposed rule is poorly drafted); William J. Flynn, Letter, Gender Handbook, Fla. Bar News, Sept. 1, 1992, at 2 
(calling the entire rule a “joke” and “unenforceable.”). 
 107. See infra text accompanying notes 108–117. 
 108. John Risca Williams, Letter, Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS. Sept. 1, 1992, at 2; see also Reid Rambo, supra 
note 106, at 2 (complaining that the entire rule is comprised of undefined terms). One commentator later expressed 
the contrary viewpoint, that the list of protected classes was sufficient to “particularize” the rule beyond a general 
proscription of conduct. Batey, supra note 92, at 394 n.39. 
 109. Williams, supra note 108, at 2.  
 110. Truesdell, supra note 83, at 2. Although Truesdell asserted that the “main thrust of the rule is right,” with 
the exception of sexual orientation, he nevertheless also accused the Bar Board of Governors as presenting a “new 
high in racial hypersensitivity.” Another attorney later commended Truesdell’s response. William C. Davell, Letter, 
Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 3. 
 111. See, e.g., Stuart Golberg, No Comment, Progressive, Sept. 2013, at 5 (referring to a New Hampshire 
partisan who postulated that gay marriage laws would result in the legalization of plural marriages and bestiality). 
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Governors personal agenda also wish to protect those Satanists who 
might sacrifice the occasional virgin?112 
Even one member of the Board of Governors worried whether the rule could be used 
to discipline a lawyer who expressed views against “voodooism and Satanism.”113 
Another objection was that the rule would violate an attorney’s First Amendment 
rights of freedom of religion and freedom of speech by prohibiting an attorney from 
expressing opprobrium for homosexual conduct or declining to hire a homosexual 
person.114 One attorney, calling the proposal “downright offensive garbage,” argued 
that attorneys have the constitutional right to associate with those who do not “assault 
their religious beliefs.”115 Still another attorney noted that if he had to choose 
between being a Christian and being an attorney, he would choose to stay with his 
Christian beliefs.116 
A further objection recognized the long-held position of the armed forces barring 
openly LGBT members from serving,117 as well as other Florida laws which treat 
LGBT persons differently from other minorities.118 Those attorneys defending 
compliance with these laws would arguably run afoul of the anti-bias rule.119 
A final objection was political in nature, arguing that the Florida Bar was 
pursuing a “liberal” agenda,120 while bowing to “political correctness.”121 One 
attorney urged the Bar to devote “less time on homosexuals, discrimination, social 
issues,” and the like.122 Another attorney accused the Bar of being “struck with 
schizophrenia” for drafting “something so blatantly liberal as the ‘anti-bias’ 
rules,”123 while another referred to “social engineering provoked by a small, 
amorphous but vocal group.”124 
Thanks in no small part to the public criticism, the Board of Governors began to 
feel the pressure to reconsider its decision.125 As the September 24, 1992, meeting 
approached, individual Board members received many personal communications 
 ________________________  
 112. Charles E. Butler III, Letter, Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 3. Another attorney 
complained that “Femme-Nazis have infiltrated the last bastion of intellectual freedom.” Currier, supra note 46, at 
3. For an argument invoking pedophilia as a sexual orientation, see infra text accompanying note 166. 
 113. Blankenship III, supra note 103, at 5. 
 114. Williams, supra note 108, at 2. The author asserted, however, that he supported the anti-bias rule being 
extended to other named categories. He did not explain why the First Amendment would not apply to those 
categories as well. See also Blankenship III, supra note 103, at 5 (referring to “concerns about First Amendment 
issues”); Friedman, supra note 4, at 3 (stating that “concerns about [ . . . ] religious opinions should not be dismissed 
lightly.”). 
 115. L. Floyd Price, Letter, Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 2. 
 116. Dale L. Price, Letter, Bias Rules, FLA. BAR NEWS, Sept. 15, 1992, at 2 (“I am placed in the position of 
choosing between losing my freedom of religious expression and association or terminating my law practice.”). 
 117. Williams, supra note 108, at 2; Truesdell, supra note 83, at 2. 
 118. Truesdell, supra note 83, at 2 (noting the bans on gay adoption and gay marriage in the Florida Statutes). 
 119. Id.; Williams, supra note 108, at 2. 
 120. William A. Oughterson, Letter, ABA Abortion, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 39. 
 121. Currier, supra note 46, at 3; Thompson, supra note 104, at 2. See John Hume, Letter, Free Speech, FLA. 
BAR NEWS, Apr. 1, 1993, at 2 (commending a federal judge for withstanding “political correctness” by ruling against 
allowing a lesbian and gay group from marching in the New York City St. Patrick’s Day Parade). 
 122. Oughterson, supra note 120, at 39. 
 123. Eichelberg, supra note 45, at 3. 
 124. Friedman, supra note 4, at 3. 
 125. Killian III, supra note 105, at 27. 
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expressing grave concerns about the proposed rule.126 Board Member Walter 
Campbell noted that he had “received numerous letters and numerous comments 
from my constituents, all who feel The Florida Bar should not be legislating in our 
rules regarding conduct over sexual preference.”127 Campbell, who earlier had 
supported the addition of sexual orientation to the rule, made a motion to reconsider 
the addition.128 He argued that the original vote had divided The Bar; and further, 
because inclusion of sexual orientation was made based on a request actually 
received at the prior Board meeting, the Board had no fair notice then to consider the 
request with deliberation.129 While several other Board members spoke in support of 
Campbell’s motion for reconsideration, it failed by a single vote, eighteen to 
nineteen.130 All the women on the Board of Governors present voted against 
reconsideration,131 as did the two representatives from the Young Lawyers 
Division.132 
The Board’s Ad Hoc Committee on Discrimination also presented proposed 
comments at the September 1992 meeting for Board consideration.133 The 
Committee’s intention was to make clear that attorneys acting in accordance with 
existing law could not face Bar discipline.134 The comments arose from a concern 
that under the proposed rule, those attorneys representing the military or the 
government could face sanctions because “military law prohibits homosexuals from 
serving and state law prohibits homosexuals from adopting.”135 Some also feared 
that without the comments, the rule could provide an impetus for complaints being 
brought against attorneys for conduct involving the attorney’s personal life.136 More 
than one Board member questioned whether this type of exemption should be in the 
actual rule itself, rather than merely a comment.137 Unlike the addition of sexual 
orientation to the proposed rule, members of the Board raised sufficient questions 
 ________________________  
 126. Gary Blankenship, Board Stands Firm on Sexual Orientation Anti-Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 15, 
1992, at 8 [hereinafter cited as Blankenship IV]. See also Killian III, supra note 105, at 27 (“a number of Board 
members received complaints from constituents angered with the addition of sexual orientation to the rule.”). 
 127. Blankenship IV, supra note 126, at 8. Campbell later went on to become a Democratic member of the 
Florida State Senate. Skip Campbell, WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skip_Campbell (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2013). 
 128. Blankenship IV, supra note 126, at 8. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; Blankenship III, supra note 103, at 5; Anti-Bias Rules, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that the Board 
“rejected by one vote whether to reconsider its vote to include sexual orientation in the list.”). 
 131. Blankenship IV, supra note 126, at 8. These included, among others, Patricia A. Seitz, who would go on 
to become a federal district court judge, and Edith G. Osman, who would go on to become a President of The Florida 
Bar. See Coral Gables Attorney Named Federal Judge, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 30, 1998, available at 
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/ 1998-09-30/ news/ 9809300097_1_coral-gables-seitz-president-
clinton#.UieFkCPg 8IE.email (last visited Sept. 4, 2013); Kendra Brodin, Edith Osman Interview, Women Lawyers 
Online (2011), available at http://www.womenlawyersonline.com/2010/07/edith-osman-interview/ (last visited 
April 17, 2014). 
 132. Mark D. Killian, YLD Reaffirms Proposed Anti-Bias Rule Support, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 1, 1992, at 27 
[hereinafter cited as Killian IV]. 
 133. Blankenship III, supra note 103, at 5. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. See also Board to Vote, supra note 12, at 15. 
 136. Blankenship III, supra note 103, at 5. 
 137. Id. 
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about the comments to cause the Board to vote to refer the comments for revision.138 
The matter was placed on the Board’s November 1992 agenda.139 
Just over two weeks later, the matter came before the Young Lawyers Division 
of The Florida Bar.140 The Division’s two representatives on the Board of Governors 
had voted in support of adding sexual orientation to the rule, and they had also voted 
against its reconsideration.141 At the Young Lawyers Division meeting, they advised 
the members present that they would continue to oppose reconsideration unless they 
received different instructions from the Division.142 On this issue, the Young 
Lawyers Division did not oppose the two representatives’ position.143 However, 
because the comments had been tabled at the Board of Governors meeting, no clear 
position had crystallized concerning the employment practices of individual 
attorneys. One of the Division’s representatives stated that he was concerned about 
coercing attorneys to act against their “strong religious convictions” against hiring 
homosexual persons.144 
Not until after these meetings were the first public comments published 
concerning the issue of AIDS.145 Up until this time, those criticizing the proposed 
rule had avoided this subject. However, on November 15, 1992, the Florida Bar 
News published a letter from attorney Richard N. Friedman who expressed concern 
that homosexuals could conceivably bring AIDS into the workplace: 
While AIDS has crossed over into the heterosexual community, the 
vast majority of AIDS cases are demographically within the 
homosexual community. Scientists are not absolutely certain as to 
how AIDS is spread and people have rightful concerns about 
association with a member of a group which espouses a sexual 
lifestyle that is more prone to a syndrome that always brings certain 
death.146 
Friedman was perhaps also the first attorney to have his comment published on 
what might be called the “yuck” factor as a reason to not extend the rule to LGBT 
persons.147 He proffered that: 
[M]any heterosexuals simply feel uncomfortable in a workplace 
with homosexuals who manifest their sexual preference, and that 
can result in poor work performance amongst various employees in 
 ________________________  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.; Board to Vote, supra note 12, at 15. For reasons not readily apparent, the Board of Governors meeting 
for November was held in Washington, D.C.  
 140. Killian III, supra note 105, at 27. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Mark A. Gager, Letters, Safeguarding Rights, FLA. BAR NEWS, Dec. 1, 1992, at 3. 
 146. Friedman, supra note 4, at 3; see also Guyer, supra note 52, at 2 (“AIDS is almost exclusively a disease 
of drug addicts, homosexuals, prostitutes and adulterers.”). 
 147. Friedman, supra note 4, at 3. 
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the same way that a heterosexual person who is, for example, overly 
promiscuous might cause an uneasy situation to exist in the 
workplace resulting in lower productivity.148 
Friedman’s letter was in contradistinction to that of Mark A. Gager, one of the 
few attorneys who wrote in favor of the proposed rules.149 Gager argued that: 
Sexism and bigotry must end. We must by our own example free 
our minds and our profession of the ignorance and fear which causes 
hatred. How can we do our jobs properly if in our own office we 
foster archaic prejudices and obsolete stereotypes? . . .We may not 
always approve or like the gender, race, creed, or lifestyle of our 
clients and coworkers, but our duty is not to sit in judgment. Our 
obligation is not to “wash our hands” of a person who is different 
from us. Our job is to do our job and do it zealously and in good 
conscience. For if we do not then we will not stand up for people 
who we think are unsavory. Then we will not stand up for people 
who are labeled by stereotypes and prejudice. Then after civil rights 
have been completely eroded we may be too weak to stand up for 
people who were once considered mainstream, but are now 
oppressed.150 
As the November meeting approached, an ad hoc committee of the Board of 
Governors attempted to draft comments that would address the many concerns raised 
at the October Board meeting.151 Perhaps surprisingly, the Board of Governors 
approved the comments at the November meeting without lengthy debate.152 The 
 ________________________  
 148. Id. 
 149. Gager, supra note 145, at 3.  
 150. Id. The attorney also alluded to the unwillingness of others to support the Jews during the Holocaust. Id.  
 151. Gary Blankenship, Anti-Bias Rules Sent to High Court, FLA. BAR NEWS, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter 
Blankenship V]. 
 152. Id. The proposed comment to Rule 4-8.4(d), relating to misconduct related to discrimination, read as 
follows: 
Subdivision (d) of this rule proscribes conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. Such proscription includes, without limitation, the prohibition against certain 
discriminatory conduct committed by a lawyer while engaged in the practice of law. Such 
conduct, when directed towards litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers 
whether based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, 
sexual orientation, or age, subverts the administration of justice and undermines the public’s 
confidence in our system of justice, as well as traditional notions of equality. Accordingly, 
where such conduct is not otherwise protected or authorized by applicable law or rules of 
evidence, such as when a lawyer is examining a witness or adducing admissible evidence or 
matter that may lead to admissible evidence, discipline under the Rules Regulating The 
Florida Bar is appropriate. 
Unlike rule 4-7.8, this rule does not require a prior finding by a court or an agency as a 
condition of enforcement by The Florida Bar.Subdivision (d) of this rule does not prohibit a 
lawyer from representing a client as may be permitted by applicable law, such as, by way of 
example, representing a client accused of committing discriminatory conduct or impeaching 
the credibility of witnesses or challenging fitness in custody or adoption proceedings. 
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chair of the committee noted that he believed the group drafted the comments by 
considering every possible interpretation of the rules.153 The comments noted a safe 
harbor for an attorney—if discriminatory conduct does not violate law, it cannot 
serve as a basis for attorney discipline.154 A contingent of the Board wanted to make 
the rules stronger than those proposed by the committee by clearly specifying that 
“lawyers could not discriminate in the running of their practices, including in hiring, 
firing, promotions, and pay.”155 The Board ultimately, however, approved the 
proposed comments, with a single disapproving vote.156 All in all, the Board felt the 
rule and comments adequately specified what conduct was improper, and attorneys 
who “act like lawyers” in representing their clients would not be disciplined.157 The 
proposed rule and comments were thereupon referred to the Florida Supreme Court 
for consideration.158 
In keeping with Florida Bar procedures,159 the entire proposed rule was 
published in the Florida Bar News on December 1, 1992, soliciting responses from 
any interested party.160 Publication of the notice provoked another wave of 
responses.161 Although the Rules specifically provided that these comments were to 
be “served on the executive director of The Florida Bar,”162 many of them were 
instead submitted to the News and subsequently published as letters to the editor.163 
Not until June 1993, however, did the Florida Supreme Court call for comments to 
the similar proposed changes to the judicial canons.164 
The new wave of comments provided additional arguments against the proposed 
rule.165 One attorney argued that pedophilia was “a sexual orientation;” and as a 
 ________________________  
Official Notice: Bar Proposes Anti-Bias Rules, FLA. BAR NEWS, Dec. 1, 1992, at 4 [hereinafter Official Notice]. 
 153. Blankenship V, supra note 151, at 1. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 5. 
 156. Id. This almost unanimous approval of the comments did not, however, mean that the Board was nearly 
unanimous in its approval of the underlying rule. Even at this meeting, some Board members continued to doubt 
“the constitutionality of the rules as explained in the comments.” Id. For a discussion of previous arguments 
pertaining to the constitutionality of the proposed rule, see supra text accompanying notes 72, 114–15. 
 157. Blankenship V, supra note 151, at 1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR, Rule 1-12.1(g) (1992):  
Notice of intent to file a petition to amend these Rules Regulating The Florida Bar shall be 
published in The Florida Bar News at least 30 days before the filing of the petition. The notice 
shall set forth the text of the proposed amendments, shall state the date the petition will be 
filed and shall state that any comments or objections must be filed within 30 days of filing the 
petition. A copy of all comments or objections shall be served on the Executive Director of 
The Florida Bar and any persons who may have made an appearance in the matter. 
Id. See also The Florida Bar Re: Amendments to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar, 587 So. 2d 1121, 1124–25 (Fla. 
1991) (setting forth and approving language of rule); Henry P. Trawick, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Social Engineering, 
FLA. BAR NEWS, Dec. 1, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Trawick] (criticizing the process).  
 160. The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1993). 
Official Notice, supra note 152, at 4. 
 161. See infra text accompanying notes 166–169. 
 162. RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR, Rule 1-12.1(g) (1992). 
 163. See infra text accompanying notes 165–169; Thompson, supra note 104, at 2; Robert G. Kerrigan, Letter 
to the Editor, Gender Bias, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 2. 
 164. Supreme Court to Consider, supra note 15, at 1, 10. 
 165. George R. Dekle, Sr., Letter to the Editor, Anti-Bias Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jan. 15, 1993, at 2. 
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result, “suspected pedophiles” must be allowed to remain on a jury if the rule were 
adopted.166 He continued that the right to use peremptory challenges in general would 
be eliminated.167 The attorney believed the issue was really one of mere etiquette, 
and therefore the rule was unnecessary because “you cannot legislate morality.”168 
Another attorney mentioned the possibility of “Gay Bar and Pedophile Bar 
associations,” wondering if those organizations were already in the process of being 
created.169 
By January 1, 1993, before the report proposing the rule had even been formally 
presented to the Florida Supreme Court,170 one attorney filed a lawsuit in the 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida to have the rule declared unconstitutional.171 He 
noted his belief that most attorneys in the state would support his lawsuit because of 
the numerous letters published in the Florida Bar News “nearly unanimously 
expressing misgivings” concerning the rule.172 
The first printed complaint in the Florida Bar News mentioning transgender 
persons appeared in February 1993.173 Here the attorney, after giving tongue-in-
cheek accolades to the Bar for addressing the “very serious business” of “name-
calling,” asked whether it were improper to refer to a “transvestite” judge as “she.”174 
The same attorney further wondered how an attorney could avoid discipline if it were 
not clear to the attorney if the person was a man or a woman.175 
THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT AND THE APPROVED RULES 
The Florida Bar did not submit its petition unilaterally.176 It was joined by the 
group of attorneys who had originally initiated the petition process.177 While both 
groups agreed that sexual orientation should be covered by the rule, they disagreed 
 ________________________  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 13 
n.41 (1997) (noting that the Florida rule does not “expressly mention peremptory challenges”). 
 168. Dekle, supra note 165, at 2. 
 169. James W. Middleton, Letter to the Editor, Rainbow Bar? FLA. BAR NEWS, Apr. 1, 1993, at 2. The main 
gist of Middleton’s letter, however, was dissatisfaction with the creation of an African-American Bar Association 
in Florida, which divided Florida attorneys into “us” and “them.” Id. 
 170. Under Florida Supreme Court procedures, a petition is not filed with the Florida Supreme Court 
immediately upon the Bar’s providing official notice of the rule. RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR, Rule 1-
12.1(g) (1992), (referring to notice of “intent” to file petition). In this case, the notice provided that the petition 
would be filed “on or about January 4, 1993.” Official Notice, supra note 152, at 4. 
 171. Thompson, supra note 104, at 2.  
 172. Id. The Florida Supreme Court later summarily upheld the constitutionality of the rule against a 
vagueness challenge. Fla. Bar v. Von Zamft, 814 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 2002); see 4 Fla. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law 
§118 (West 2014) (briefly discussing Von Zamft). 
 173. Kerrigan, supra note 163, at 2. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Mark D. Killian, Supreme Court Hears Bias Rules Arguments, FLA. BAR NEWS, Apr. 15, 1993, at 3 
[hereinafter Killian V]. 
 177. Id. For a discussion of the initiation of the petition process, see supra text accompanying note 12. See 
Suellyn Scarnecchia, State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 16 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 923, 947 (1993) (explaining the process of how the petition was submitted jointly in Florida). Other groups 
similarly expressed support in public speeches in favor of the rule amendments, such as the Equal Opportunities in 
the Profession Committee. See Bar Panel Recommends Goals for Hiring Minority Lawyers, FLA. BAR NEWS, June 
15, 1993, at 16. 
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as to how the employment discrimination rule should be enforced.178 Supreme Court 
review, however, was not limited to the joint petition. The court received twenty-
two briefs and written comments from interested parties, six in favor of the proposals 
and sixteen opposed.179 One of the briefs filed in favor of the proposal was that of 
the Gay and Lesbian Lawyers Association,180 the group that was instrumental in 
having sexual orientation added to the proposal.181  
The Florida Supreme Court set oral argument for April 5, 1993.182 The Court 
heard not only from the group of petitioners and the Board of Governors, but also 
several interested parties.183 The proponents of the rules set out their primary 
argument: The rules relied primarily on constitutional arguments, as well as an 
attorney’s duty to zealously represent a client.184 Those appearing against the rules 
“argued the rules infringe on lawyers’ constitutional rights, could chill zealous 
advocacy, and are overbroad.”185 Frank Scruggs, the attorney who had begun the 
petition process,186 argued that “25 years after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., the nation should not still be debating discrimination.”187 Alan Dimond, 
President of The Florida Bar, dismissed claims that the rule would violate an 
attorney’s First Amendment rights by arguing that the rule was limited in scope to 
lawyers acting as lawyers.188 As a result, he argued the rule would survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.189 Rosemary B. Wilder, a Miami attorney, presented an oral 
argument on behalf of GALLA, the LGBT lawyers group.190 She responded to 
concerns about the potential vagueness of the proposal by arguing that “the Florida 
Supreme Court can easily determine what is discrimination and misconduct and what 
is not.”191  
Attorney Robert M. Brake, however, argued specifically against the sexual 
orientation and marital status portions of the rule, noting that attorneys have a 
 ________________________  
 178. Killian V, supra note 176, at 3. The Bar sided with New Jersey, New York, Minnesota, and California, 
all of which required an agency finding of discriminatory conduct before Bar discipline could be imposed. Id. The 
petitioner group, however, sided with Vermont, the District of Columbia, and Michigan, which authorized their Bars 
to “prosecute discrimination claims.” Id. See also Mark D. Killian, Court Approves Anti-Bias Rules, FLA. BAR 
NEWS, July 15, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Killian VI] (“The petitioners wanted the Bar to investigate alleged 
employment discrimination. The Board of Governors proposed having the Bar act only after another agency had 
made a final finding of discrimination by a lawyer.”); Scarnecchia, supra note 177, at 947 (noting how the two 
groups submitted competing proposals concerning employment discrimination, but were in agreement as to the 
actual anti-bias rule). 
 179. Killian V, supra note 176, at 3. “Those objecting to the anti-bias rules included groups as diverse as the 
Center for Law and Religious Freedom and the Florida Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union.” Id. 
 180. Id. See Blankenship II, supra note 75, at 5. 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90.  
 182. Killian V, supra note 176, at 1, 3.  
 183. Because of the amount of speakers desiring to speak in opposition to the proposal, each opposing speaker 
was given only a very brief time to make a statement. See Trawick, supra note 159, at 2 (noting that he was given 
only ninety seconds to make his argument). 
 184. Killian V, supra note 176, at 1. 
 185. Id.  
 186. See Killian VI, supra note 178, at 1; see also supra text accompanying note 12. 
 187. Killian V, supra note 176, at 3. 
 188. Id. at 1, 3. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1, 3. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (discussing GALLA). 
 191. Killian V, supra note 176, at 3. 
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“constitutional right to believe the conduct is wrong, speak and write that it is wrong, 
and in the right of privacy and association, not associate with persons who engage in 
that sort of conduct.”192 He raised the specter that under the rules, attorneys would 
not be able to disassociate themselves from Nazis and members of the Ku Klux 
Klan.193 Attorney Douglas K. Silvis believed that the expansion of racial 
discrimination protection to include sexual orientation would circumscribe his 
religious tenets, including the sharing of his faith, and stated “[i]t would be wrong 
for me to be in a law or business practice with people who do not share my religious 
convictions because of the spiritual accountability that goes along with the legal 
principle of accountability of partners.”194 
On July 1, 1993, the Florida Supreme Court issued its decision on the rule 
case.195 The Bar’s proposal differed from that ultimately approved by the Court. The 
Court rejected completely proposed Rule 4-8.4(h) dealing with employment 
discrimination, providing four reasons for doing so.196 First, the Court believed it did 
not have the constitutional power to regulate the area of employment, even if it 
involved attorneys.197 Second, the Court found that federal and state law already set 
forth a procedure for handling discrimination claims.198 Third, the proposed rule 
provided no “clearcut standards” to determine misconduct.199 And fourth, the rule 
would cost too much to implement.200 Three of the Justices disagreed with this part 
of the ruling, believing instead that the Florida Supreme Court does have 
constitutional authority to regulate a lawyer’s employment practices.201 In sum, these 
three Justices argued that “if all qualifying factors for a position are present, one 
cannot refuse to hire simply because of a person’s ‘status,’ a totally irrelevant 
consideration. This is right and we should say so.”202 
As for the anti-bias portion of the proposal, Rule 4-8.4(d), the Florida Supreme 
Court unanimously approved the rule with two minor variations.203 First, the Court 
specifically limited application of the rule to conduct “in connection with the practice 
of law,” and second, the Court expanded the reach of the rule to “any basis” of bias, 
specifically adding “socioeconomic status, employment, or physical 
characteristic.”204 Hearkening back to the argument made by Victoria Sigler when 
 ________________________  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 720 (Fla. 
1993). See Terl, supra note 8, at 830–31 (discussing Supreme Court decision). 
 196. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 722. See also Killian VI, supra note 178, at 1 (“The court rejected 
both proposed employment discrimination rules.”); Terl, supra note 8, at 831. 
 197. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 722. See also Killian VI, supra note 178, at 3 (discussing the Court’s 
rationale). 
 198. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 722. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 723–24 (Barkett, C.J., concurring). Justice Rosemary Barkett was joined by Justices Leander Shaw 
and Gerald Kogan. 
 202. Id. at 724. See Killian VI, supra note 178, at 3 (discussing view of dissenting Justices). 
 203. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 722. 
 204. Id. See also Killian VI, supra note 178, at 1, 3 (quoting the rule as approved by the Florida Supreme 
Court). 
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she first proposed adding sexual orientation to the rule,205 the Supreme Court briefly 
explained its reasoning for approving Rule 4-8.4(d): 
A judicial system cannot survive public confidence in its 
evenhanded administration of justice. As officers of the court, 
lawyers involved in the system have a significant impact upon the 
public’s perception of the system’s objectivity. A system of justice 
that tolerates expression of bias by lawyers cannot maintain public 
confidence in the discharge of its responsibilities to assure equal 
justice.206 
The Court also dismissed First Amendment objections by noting that the limitation 
of the rule to “conduct in connection with the practice of law” sufficiently protected 
an attorney’s First Amendment rights.207 
The Supreme Court’s ruling was analyzed as front-page news in the July 15, 
1993 issue of the Florida Bar News.208 Florida attorneys were advised in a fairly 
conspicuous subheading that the “[r]ules now provide sanctions for attorneys who 
discriminate in legal proceedings, but stop short of regulating practices.”209 While 
the proponents of the rule amendments were not completely satisfied with the 
decision, they did recognize it as a major milestone against discriminatory 
conduct.210 Alan Dimond, who had been President of the Bar at the time the case was 
argued, viewed the Court’s decision as a “public declaration against discrimination,” 
bringing Florida courts into “the national forefront in the fight for equal justice.”211 
Patricia Seitz, the new President of the Bar, predicted that notwithstanding the 
opposition from some lawyers, now that the anti-bias rule was adopted, Florida 
lawyers would fall in line and work towards a non-discriminatory system of 
justice.212 
Not all members agreed with Seitz. One attorney quickly responded to the 
decision by arguing that the new rule was “pernicious” because it will limit the ability 
of a lawyer to use necessary “dramatic tools” to represent their clients.213 In an 
unusual move apparently aimed at ameliorating this attorney’s concerns, the editor 
 ________________________  
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90.  
 206. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 721. See also Killian VI, supra note 178, at 1 (summarizing the 
Court’s rationale); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not 
Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209, 218–19 & n.31 (2003) (discussing rationale in Florida). 
 207. Amendments to Rules, 624 So. 2d at 721. See Robert A. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of 
Interference in Law School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 2026 (2003) (referring to “otherwise protected 
speech” that “can merit disciplinary action”). See also supra note 172 (discussing unsuccessful vagueness 
challenge). See generally Andrew E. Taslitz and Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the First 
Amendment is No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 781 (1996). 
 208. Killian VI, supra note 178, at 1.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. at 3. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. As earlier noted, Seitz later became a federal district court judge. See supra note 131. 
 213. Harry D. Lewis, Letter, Disparagement Rule, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1, 1993, at 2 (arguing that 
“discrimination based on moral degeneracy” might be proper and “richly deserved” in a given case). 
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of the Florida Bar News responded by noting that “[r]elevant remarks in furtherance 
of zealous representation are allowed, as set out in the comments to the rule.”214 Two 
months later, another attorney expressed condescending frustration with the reach of 
the rule when he noted cynically that he “was somewhat disheartened that lawyers 
are still allowed to disparage, humiliate, and discriminate when it is relevant to the 
proof of any legal or factual issue in dispute.”215 He further suggested that the 
creation of minority bar associations was in itself a violation of the rule, and that he 
could not use the gender-based rules of etiquette he had learned as a child.216 This 
was followed by a letter from another attorney who accused the Florida Supreme 
Court of “approv[ing] social engineering in the guise of legal ethics.”217 
Supporters of the rule responded. A Stetson University law student, who 
identified himself as a “white heterosexual,”218 responded with a clear defense of the 
rule, specifically arguing that an attorney’s: 
[T]houghts and opinions are his own. However, under the 
amendment, he may not act with impunity on attitudes of bias which 
adversely impact on those in the legal system. [. . .] To the extent 
“political correctness” seeks equal application of justice for all legal 
practitioners and litigants, as embodied in the amendment, so be it. 
It is time our society and our legal profession celebrate our diverse 
society and acknowledge that it is a violation of principles of 
humanity and justice to tolerate unequal treatment based on bias 
against race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, 
marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, 
employment or physical characteristic.219 
On September 29, 1994, more than a year after approval of the attorney conduct 
rule, the Florida Supreme Court further approved the amendment to Canon 3B(5) 
governing judicial conduct, to take effect January 1, 1995.220 The language was 
modeled after the language proposed as part of the American Bar Association Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct.221 However, upon a suggestion from a petitioner, the 
Supreme Court added a final sentence not appearing in the Model Code to make clear 
a judge could consider anything relevant to the proceeding before the judge without 
violating the Canon.222 
 ________________________  
 214. Id. 
 215. Douglas M. Fraley, Letter, Discrimination, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1993, at 2. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Trawick, supra note 159, at 2. 
 218. Michael T. Dolce, Letter, Bias Amendment, FLA. BAR NEWS, Nov. 1, 1993, at 4. 
 219. Id. 
 220. In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1039–40 (Fla. 1994). See Terl, supra note 8, at 831 
(discussing amendment).  
 221. Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d at 1037–38. 
 222. Id. at 1037, 1039–40. 
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULE AND CANON 
Violation of the anti-disparagement rule223 may subject a Florida attorney to 
discipline.224 Since the rule was promulgated twenty years ago, however, only seven 
Florida reported cases225 have discussed the rule while mentioning sexual 
orientation,226 and only two more out of state.227 One commentator has defined 
Florida’s anti-disparagement rule as being within the realm of “civility,”228 and noted 
that traditionally a mere isolated breach of a civility rule will not garner Bar 
discipline.229 Nevertheless, the rule, which is broader in scope than most states,230 
has served as a model for other jurisdictions.231 
In practice, the scope of conduct governed by the rule, although extensive,232 has 
not raised much dispute. One commentator referred to the Florida rule as regulating 
conduct “in the course of client representation.”233 Although the Florida Supreme 
Court had added a qualifier on the rule that it was limited in scope to an attorney’s 
 ________________________  
 223. Although the Florida rule has long been referred to as the “anti-discrimination rule,” it has also been 
referred to, perhaps more precisely, as the “anti-disparagement rule.” See Carla D. Pratt, Should Klansmen Be 
Lawyers? Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 878 (2003); Lewis, 
supra note 213, at 2. 
 224. 4 Fla. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law §103 (2008). 
 225. Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2010); Fla. Bar v. Kleppin, 2010 WL 6983305 (Fla. 2010); In re 
Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 24 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 2009); Fla. Bar v. Abramson, 3 So. 3d 964 
(Fla. 2009); Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 875 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2004); Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 
So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000); Fla. Bar v. Schramm, 668 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1996). 
 226. Under Florida Bar procedures, not every disciplinary action against an attorney is released for publication 
or otherwise made public. See In re Fuller, 930 A.2d 194, 195, 199 (D.C. 2007) (referring to a difference between 
Florida Bar discipline and D.C. Bar discipline). 
 227. Winston v. Boatright, 649 F.3d 618, 631 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Florida rule prohibits 
discrimination in selection of jurors); In re Fuller, 930 A.2d at 197 & n.3 (D.C. 2007) (attorney admitted in both 
Florida and District of Columbia received reciprocal D.C. punishment as a result of Florida violation of rule 4-8.4(d) 
when attorney erroneously referred to his client as a quadriplegic). 
 228. David A. Grenardo, Making Civility Mandatory: Moving from Aspired to Required, 11 CARDOZO PUB. 
L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 239, 255 n.90 (2013) (“Florida uses Rule 4-8.4 to enforce civility”). 
 229. Id. at 255, quoting John T. Berry, former Director of the Center of Professionalism at the University of 
Florida College of Law. See id. at 243 n.14, 256 n.91. See also In re Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, 
116 So. 3d 280, 280–81(Fla. 2013) (noting that in terms of attorney discipline, “Florida has traditionally followed a 
more passive, academic approach,” but proposing a new more “active” approach). 
 230. Brown, supra note 206, at 281 n.273 (explaining that Florida’s anti-bias rule “goes even further with 
regard to the categories protected and the scope of the conduct prohibited”). 
 231. Comm’n on Gender Fairness in the Courts Rep., reprinted in 72 N.D. L. REV. 1115, 1146 n.51 (1996) 
(referring to the Florida rule as a “possible model” for North Dakota attorneys). See Kuehn, supra note 207, at 1997 
& n.122, 1998 & nn. 123–26, 2026 & nn. 255, 258 (discussing the “increasing number of states” to adopt 
professional conduct rules prohibiting attorneys from discriminating based on sexual orientation); Steven Richman, 
Professional Ethics and Bias in the Profession, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2001, at 37, 43 (wondering whether New Jersey 
will “move towards the approach of Florida”); Robert T. Begg, The Lawyer’s License to Discriminate Revoked: 
How a Dentist Put Teeth in New York’s Anti-Discrimination Disciplinary Rule, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 153, 157 & n.18 
(2000) (comparing the Florida rule to that of New York). 
 232. See Heather M. Kolinsky, Just Because You Can Doesn’t Mean You Should: Reconciling Attorney 
Conduct in the Context of Defamation with the New Professionalism, 37 NOVA L. REV. 113, 128 (2012) (referring 
to the rule as being “broadly written”). States not having language referring to sexual orientation have, however, 
found disparagement based on sexual orientation to be a violation of general professional conduct rules. See, e.g., 
In re Hammer, 718 S.E.2d 442, 444 (S.C. 2011) (attorney who asked about witness’s sexual orientation and HIV 
status, not relevant to the proceeding, violated South Carolina general professionalism rules). 
 233. Ashley Kissinger, Civil Rights and Professional Wrongs: A Female Lawyer’s Dilemma, 73 TEX. L. REV. 
1419, 1453–54 (1995). See also Kuehn, supra note 207, at 1998. 
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conduct “in connection with the practice of law,”234 the Court later construed the 
“practice of law” beyond merely being involved in an active court proceeding.235 In 
The Florida Bar v. Frederick,236 an attorney was accused of misconduct involving 
coercive actions towards a client.237 Hearkening back to the debate surrounding the 
proposal of the rule,238 the attorney argued that the conduct was beyond the scope of 
Rule 4-8.4(d) because the conduct did not involve a pending court case.239 The 
Supreme Court rejected this narrow construction of the practice of law, noting that 
it involved an attorney’s conduct concerning not only clients, but non-clients who 
might have some relationship to a legal situation involving the attorney.240 
In several cases, the Florida Supreme Court has applied the rule to conduct that 
it found to be disparaging, although not specifically dealing with sexual orientation. 
241A review of these cases, however, suggests what type of misconduct may trigger 
discipline if the disparagement involves sexual orientation. In the first case reported 
based singularly on Rule 4-8.4(d) since the promulgation of the rule, The Florida 
Bar v. Uhrig, the attorney sent an opposing party a letter which, among other things, 
referred to the party’s “body odor.”242 The Court found that this was done merely to 
disparage the person in violation of the rule.243 In another case a few years later, an 
attorney was reprimanded for mailing an opposing party various religious items 
completely irrelevant to the case handled by the attorney.244 Similarly, the Court 
found no purpose for this letter, other than to humiliate the other party.245 
The first reported case specifically addressing ethnicity was decided in 2001, 
The Florida Bar v. Martocci.246 In this case, the attorney used several derogatory 
comments against an opposing party, including telling her to “go back to Puerto 
Rico.”247 The Florida Supreme Court imposed a penalty which included two years’ 
probation.248 Three years later, the Court considered a case in which an attorney had 
 ________________________  
 234. The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1993). 
This was precisely the position argued by the Bar – that attorneys are free “to do whatever they like outside the 
practice of law.” Killian V, supra note 176, at 3. See also Robert R. Kuehn, Shooting the Messenger: The Ethics of 
Attacks on Environmental Representation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 451 (2002) (discussing limitation of 
Florida rule to “conduct in connection with the practice of law”); Terri R. Day & Scott L. Rogers, When Principled 
Representation Tests Antidiscrimination Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 33 & n.36 (1998) (discussing the Florida 
rule). 
 235. See generally Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000). 
 236. Id. at 79. 
 237. Id. at 87. 
 238. See Board to Vote, supra note 12, at 15 (referring to those who “worried the comments, as drafted, were 
too broad and could be used against lawyers for activities outside the practice of law”).  
 239. Frederick, 756 So. 2d at 86. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Fla. Bar v. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1996); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 2001); Fla. 
Bar v. Forrester, 916 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 99 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 2012). 
 242. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d at 888. See Timothy P. Chinaris, Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida 
Law, 21 NOVA L. REV. 231, 258–59  (1996) (discussing Uhrig). 
 243. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d at 888.  
 244. Fla. Bar v. Buckle, 771 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 2000). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Martocci, 791 So. 2d at 1074. 
 247. Id. at 1075. 
 248. Id. at 1078. 
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falsely referred to a person as a “child molester” and a “pedophile.”249 The Court 
found such conduct violated the rule.250 Most recently, the Court found an attorney 
to have violated Rule 4-8.4(d) when she, among other things, referred to her former 
client’s immigration status.251 
The few cases reported suggest, as previously noted, that The Florida Bar not 
only forwards only cases of serious or repeated misconduct to the Florida Supreme 
Court,252 but also receives fewer referrals for these violations.253 When no other 
misconduct is apparent, a public reprimand has been the most common form of 
discipline.254 However, when disparagement is coupled with other misconduct, the 
attorney has received a probationary term and, in some instances, suspension from 
the practice of law.255 
The Florida Supreme Court has recently adopted256 a new set of professionalism 
rules establishing Local Professionalism Committees to more informally address 
complaints that typically would not have been pursued by The Florida Bar.257 In 
adopting the rule, the Court recognized that previous efforts to address 
professionalism have not been as aggressive as may be needed to curb the rise in 
unprofessional conduct among Florida attorneys.258 Isolated incidents of 
disparagement that in the past might not have been pursued through the formal 
disciplinary process now have a new avenue of redress.259 
Canon 3B(5) has similarly not raised much dispute. On three occasions since its 
promulgation, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC)260 has 
referred to the Canon when issuing an opinion. In the first case involving a request 
for an opinion under a very general set of facts, the JEAC noted that opinions 
concerning a judge’s conduct under the canon were difficult to offer because the 
JEAC would have to know the specific conduct at issue giving rise to the request for 
an advisory opinion.261 This request involved a general request concerning the 
religious beliefs of prospective jurors.262 The Committee intimated that sometimes a 
line of questioning might violate the rule, but declined to offer an opinion due to the 
general nature of the request.263  
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 256. In re Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, 116 So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla. 2013). 
 257. Fla. Code for Resolving Professionalism Complaints (2013), adopted in In re Code, 116 So. 3d at 282–
84. 
 258. In re Code, at 281. 
 259. See supra text accompanying notes 229 (discussing need for repeated misconduct before Florida Bar 
discipline is available). 
 260. In Florida, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee provides “written advisory opinions to inquiring 
judges concerning the propriety of judicial and non-judicial conduct.” Petition of the Comm. on Standards of 
Conduct Governing Judges, 698 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 1997). 
 261. Fla. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 99–8 (1999). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
25
: "Doomed Social Engineering?"
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014
294 Barry Law Review Vol. 19, No. 2 
 
In a subsequent JEAC case, a judge desired to serve on a non-profit organization 
which had as its goal to “study race relations.”264 The JEAC relied on the canon in 
buttressing its opinion that a judge could in fact serve on such an organization, 
because the judge’s role is to serve “without bias or prejudice.”265 The JEAC further 
noted all specified categories in the canon, including sexual orientation.266 
In the final case, the JEAC considered a request that candidates for judicial office 
sign a diversity pledge provided by the Cuban American Bar Association that the 
candidate “proudly pledge[s] to treat all who come before the Court, be they litigants, 
attorneys, jurors or witnesses, equally with respect, regardless of their race, gender, 
ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sexual orientation.”267 The candidate was also 
asked to pledge that the candidate’s “staff will always do the same.”268 The JEAC 
found that this portion of the pledge was consistent with a judge’s obligations under 
Canon 3B(5).269 
CONCLUSION 
In 1992 and 1993, the LGBT community in Florida was at the forefront of many 
controversial issues facing not just the legal community, but also the citizenry at 
large. The majority of LGBT persons still feared leaving the closet because of the 
possibility of losing employment, as well as family, friends, and a place to live.270 
Now more than twenty years after the anti-bias rule debate began, being out of the 
closet is not an impediment to success for many LGBT professionals.271 Similarly, 
in the legal field, while most LGBT attorneys believe discrimination is still common 
in the legal profession, the great majority of LGBT attorneys themselves claim not 
to have experienced discrimination.272  Fewer and fewer LGBT persons remain in 
the closet.273 The presence of LGBT persons in society at large is becoming more 
commonplace.274 Nevertheless, LGBT persons continue to face publicly expressed 
opprobrium,275 although it is now often quickly condemned.276  
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In the Florida legal community, few reported cases of disparagement based on 
sexual orientation suggest a maturation of society and a real sensitivity among legal 
practitioners that public expressions of bias are unacceptable.277 Nevertheless, the 
possibility of termination from employment continues to be legally permissible for 
many LGBT persons working in the legal profession in Florida, as neither the State 
government,278 nor most private employers, provide protection to sexual orientation 
as a class.279 The LGBT community should take some comfort, however, that 
discriminating against a person based on that person’s sexual orientation is now 
definitively contrary to the “prevailing professional norms” in the Florida judicial 
system,280 and that The Florida Bar and Local Professionalism Committees stand by 
ready to seek enforcement of the anti-disparagement rule when called upon to do 
so.281 
 
 ________________________  
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